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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) has significant security
and privacy risks. Currently, most devices connect to a cloud
service that is provided by the manufacturer of the device.
We outline a proposed model for IoT that allows the identity
of users and devices to be federated. Users and devices are issued
with secure, random, anonymised identities that are not shared
with third-parties. We demonstrate how devices can be connected
to third-party applications without inherently de-anonymising
them. Sensor data and actuator commands are federated through
APIs to cloud services. All access to device data and commands is
based on explicit consent from users. Each user’s data is handled
by a personal cloud instance providing improved security and
isolation.
We demonstrate this model is workable with a prototype
system that implements the major features of the model. We
present experiment results including performance, capacity and
cost metrics from the prototype. We compare this work with
other related work, and outline areas for discussion and future
work.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT devices are proliferating throughout the world, bringing
with them a significant threat to privacy and security. There are
multiple concerns with IoT devices. One of the key issues in
the IoT space is the concern that when a device is purchased,
it is tied to a specific web system or Cloud Service (CS),
which is owned and managed by a Cloud Service Provider
(CSP). Issues include: the CSP may not be trustworthy; the
CSP may be hacked; or may go out of business rendering the
device inoperable. A common attack on CSPs has been to steal
credentials and publish users’ passwords.
In addition, there are other security and privacy concerns.
Small, inexpensive and/or low-power devices do not properly
support encryption allowing communications to be stolen.
Few devices use well-defined identity models, meaning that
spoofing attacks are possible. Data may be validly shared by
multiple cloud services but then aggregated to de-anonymise
user information and infringe on privacy.
We outline a new model, together with a prototype and
experimental results that aims to address these issues. We call
this model OAuthing.
A. Contributions
The contributions of this work in addressing these issues
include:
• An architecture and system model that allows the decou-
pling of multiple parties: the manufacturer, the identity
provider, the device identity management, and cloud
services and applications that require access to IoT data.
This decoupling encourages choice of provider as well as
reducing the data available in any given attack.
• Clearly defined device and user registration processes,
based on the OAuth2 protocol, that have been extended to
support IoT devices and be effective in device scenarios.
• A model for providing anonymous identities for users,
reducing the chance that leaked data can be tied to users.
• An architecture that provides each user with a separate
cloud instance to handle sharing device data, and an
approach for dynamically provisioning these cloud in-
stances.
• A demonstration of the workability of the model through
the creation of a working prototype, and experimental
results including performance, cost and capacity metrics
of the prototype.
B. Outline of the paper
The remainder of this paper continues with the following
organization. In section II we propose a model of the different
parties involved and an architecture which supports decoupling
of different actors in the environment. In section III we
outline a prototype middleware system that we have created to
implement this model, alongside prototype devices and cloud
services that demonstrate end-to-end flows. In section IV we
outline the experimental results, together with the test harness
that was built to gather data. We discuss the related work
and compare it to our results in section V.w In section VI
we analyse the outcomes of the experimental results and the
overall model. We also outline a set of further work identified
during this research.
II. MODEL
A. Participants
Figure 1 shows the current situation for many IoT systems,
where there is no federation and the device talks to a single
service that manages identity, stores data, provides a user
web interface, etc. By comparison, the federated model we
present in Figure 2 allows different federated parties to provide
different services that work together. We call this model
OAuthing. Figure 3 shows the UML sequence diagram of a
runtime interaction between a device and a cloud service.
The participants of the OAuthing model are:
Fig. 1: Existing model Fig. 2: Proposed Model
Fig. 3: Device publishing data to CS
• The User Identity Provider (UIdP): this is an existing
login system where Users present their credentials (e.g.
Google, Facebook, Github, Twitter, or any OIDC login).
• The User: A User may own one or more Devices. A User
must have at least one identity with a UIdP.
• The Device Identity Provider (DIdP): this is an Identity
Broker that first authenticates a User with a UIdP using
existing federated identity protocols including OAuth2,
OpenID Connect (OIDC), or SAML2. Once the identity
is validated it then creates a secure random anonymous
identity which is used in all further processing. This
anonymous identity is not shared except with the Intel-
ligent Gateway. Devices and Cloud Services are issued
with random tokens that give permission to perform
certain actions but do not identify users in any way.
Currently, each instance of OAuthing has a single DIdP.
• Personal Cloud Middleware (PCM): this is an isolated
broker that shares data between devices and Third Party
Applications (TPAs) on behalf of the user. The PCM talks
to the Devices and the TPAs. Within the remit of a single
OAuthing instance there is one PCM per user. We utilize a
cloud environment to dynamically launch PCM instances
on behalf of users as needed.
• Intelligent Gateway (IG): The IG interfaces with the
DIdP to validate identities and access authorization poli-
cies and to the cloud infrastructure to instantiate new
PCMs. Devices and CSs connect to the IG, and it routes
requests to each user’s PCM.
• Third Party Application (TPA): A device is an IoT
device if and only if it shares or receives data and com-
mands with an Internet service. Users control which TPAs
can access their sensor data or control their actuators by
explicitly consenting to authorize a TPA. Any third party
can provide a TPA. If no TPA is authorized by the user
then a Device’s data is neither shared nor stored.
• The Device: The device consists of one or more sensors
and actuators together with a controller. The device is
issued with a Client ID at manufacturing time. Once the
device is registered with a user, it stores a token that
identifies the user, the Client ID and the scopes of access
that the user has authorized.
• The Manufacturer: The Manufacturer is the logical
organisation that creates and markets the Device, irre-
spective of whether they actually outsource any part of
the physical manufacturing to a third party. In this model,
the Manufacturer configures each device with a single
DIdP.
The OAuth2 protocol [1] is a widely used federated authen-
tication and authorization protocol. This model utilises the
OAuth2 model as a basis for the identity and ownership of
devices. One concern with IoT is that hardware devices can
be compromised and secrets read from them. It is therefore
important that each device has its own credentials. We map
each device to be a unique OAuth2 Client, and we use the
OAuth2 Client ID as a secure device ID that is only ever shared
with the DIpD. We define ownership of a device by the user
authorizing the issuance a security token to the device giving
it permission to act on the user’s behalf.
B. Lifecycle
We modelled the lifecycle of a device. The UML lifecycle
diagram is shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: Lifecycle of a Device Fig. 5: Information Visibility
Matrix
Once the device is initially flashed it is connected to a
manufacturing server. The manufacturer then uses the DCR
API into the DIpD to request a Client ID and Secret. These
are configured into the device by the manufacturing server. At
the same time, the DIpD returns a unique User Registration
URL (URU) that is printed onto the device (usually as a QR
code) by the manufacturer.
When the user buys the device, they scan the QR code or
otherwise access the URU. This directs the user to the DIpD
which presents a choice of UIpDs to the user. Once the user
is authorized with their existing UIpD, they are asked in turn
to authorize the device. The resulting OAuth2 refresh token is
then stored on the device, and represents the logical ownership
of the device.
If at some future point the user sells the device they can
revoke the OAuth2 token - either by resetting the device back
to its initial state or by using a web interface at the DIdP.
C. Personal Cloud Middleware
A key part of the model is the concept of a personal hub:
where each user’s data is routed to its’ own hub, protecting
the data from multi-tenant attacks. Each hub is run in its own
virtualised Cloud environment. When a request comes in from
a device or CS, we use the anonymous identity associated
with the bearer token to route the request to an instance that
is specific to that user. If there is no cloud server available,
the routing system makes a call to the cloud management
system to instantiate a new PCM “on-demand”, and then waits
until the instance is running before routing the request to the
PCM. In the model the PCM supports routing, distribution of
data and commands, as well as summarisation and filtering of
data. These capabilities have an important role in protecting
users privacy: firstly, the runtime does not inherently share
data such as IP addresses or MAC addresses that can be
used to identify devices or users. Secondly, by filtering or
summarising data, the PCM can avoid many fingerprinting
attacks on devices [2]. The PCM can also provide protocol
mapping and device shadow capabilities, meaning that it is
simpler for TPAs to connect to devices.
D. Information visibility
The model allows us to analyse which identifiers and data
each participant has access to. A key aim of this model is to
ensure that each party has a restricted view of a users actions
and therefore can only breach privacy in a limited way or with
the help of a third party.
In Figure 5 we identify each participant and show what
access they have to credentials, identities and data.
The manufacturer only knows the original device identity
(e.g. MAC address) and the Client ID that was issued at man-
ufacturing time. Unless the user chooses to share information
with the manufacturer, then the manufacturer does not know
the owner of the device and do not see any device data.
The DIdP knows the original user profile as provided by the
UIdP. This is only used to ensure that two tokens issued to
the same user will result in messages being routed to the same
PCM. The DIdP is aware of the device presence (because the
device must regularly refresh its tokens, and because the IG
must introspect those tokens). However, the DIdP does not see
any of the device data or commands. The DIdP is aware of
which TPAs a user is subscribed to, but does not know which
devices are interacting with which TPAs. In the event the DIdP
is compromised, the attackers cannot steal passwords or any
user data — only the link between the UIdP user identity and
the anonymous identity.
The IG is given an anonymous random ID for the user,
through an Introspection API on the DIpD which is only
available to IGs. The IG does not store any data. If it is
compromised, only data flowing through the system can be
stolen, and this cannot inherently be tied to a user or any
device identifier. Both the IG and the DIpD would need to be
compromised to tie that data to a specific user.
The device and any TPAs are not aware of the user’s identity
- they only see a refresh or bearer token and do not have
the authorization to call the Introspection API. Therefore a
TPA cannot deduce the user’s identity from the OAuthing
system. However, a TPA may be aware of the user’s identity
through out-of-band means. For example, if the user decides to
share their IoT data publicly on a webpage and this webpage
identifies them. Even in this case, the TPA does not know the
device id, only the data that is shared. Alternatively, the data
itself may contain personally identifiable traits: this may be
mitigated by sharing a summary or filtered data. Finally, the
device data itself is only visible to the device, the PCM and
authorized TPAs.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to validate the model, we built a prototype of
the system. We did this to answer the following research
questions: Is the proposed model implementable? Do any
specific issues emerge during implementation? Does the im-
plementation demonstrate workability: that this works in a
cost-effective approach that could be used in practice? What
performance does the prototype provide - in terms of memory
usage, latency, transaction rates and cost per transaction? How
does this performance compare to existing systems?
A. Protocol Mapping
The model has been designed to work independently of
specific protocols. However, in order to implement a prototype
we needed to make specific choices on protocols. We also
provide a mapping of part of the OAuth2 protocol into
MQTT [3] (an IoT-optimised protocol), allowing the device
to utilize a single protocol for identity, authorization and data.
This simplifies the device coding and reduces the memory
footprint of OAuthing support.
To support interoperability of devices and CSs we specified
a minimalist API for communicating data and commands,
based on MQTT. This could be extended in future, with
protocols such as HTTP and CoAP [4]. In our previous
work, there was an authorization policy model that permitted
complex rules. While this was more powerful, it was not easy
to present users with a clear consent choice. In this model,
there is a simplified approach that is based on a simple topic
model:
• /d/#: any messages sent to the /d topic or subtopics
thereof are considered data published by sensor devices.
• /c/#: any messages sent to the /c topic or subtopics
therof are considered commands published to device
actuators.
Data should be published in the SenML [5] format, but other
formats are allowed. Users can choose to authorize devices
and CSs to read or write to these topics.
The following sections outline the components that were
implemented to demonstrate the system.
B. The OAuthing DIdP
The prototype DIdP is called the OAuthing DIdP. We
implemented a number of capabilities:
• The identity broker pattern: we allow users to utilize their
existing identities with UIdPs and broker new OAuth2 to-
kens based on the tokens passed from third-party systems;
• an implementation of the Dynamic Client Registration
API [6];
• an implementation of the OAuth2 Introspection API [7];
• a Cassandra persistence layer; and
• an embedded MQTT broker that supports the mapping of
the OAuth2 Token API into the MQTT protocol.
We implemented the OAuthing DIdP as a set of containers
running in the Docker1 container system, allowing it to be
efficiently deployed and tested in a cloud environment. In our
system we do not store the users profile information. Instead
we issue each user with a new secure random anonymous
identifier. In order to associate this identity to the UIdP’s
identity, we take the name of the UIdP and the UIdPs unique
identifier and hash these together and store this against the
secure random identifier.
The embedded broker pattern solved a number of security
issues that were present in earlier iterations of this work,
including securing the OAuth2 Refresh flow.
C. IGNITE
The prototype of the IG is called IGNITE (Intelligent
Gateway for Network IoT Environments). IGNITE runs in a
Docker cloud container environment and has access to control
this Docker environment. When a device or TPA initiates an
MQTT connection with the CONNECT packet, IGNITE first
validates the Bearer Token by calling the DIdP’s introspection
API. This either returns a random anonymous ID together with
a set of scopes; or informs IGNITE that the token is invalid.
IGNITE is then responsible for launching a new cloud instance
to act as the PCM on behalf of the user, or routing the request
to the existing PCM. IGNITE also implements the security
policies defined in scopes by the DIpD, enforcing them before
routing requests to the PCM.
1http://www.docker.com
D. Personal Cloud Middleware
The PCM was implemented using the open source RSMB
MQTT broker2. This broker has a very low memory overhead,
and enabled us to run a significant number of PCM containers
on standard hardware. We have not yet implemented summari-
sation and filtering on the PCM, which will potentially enlarge
the memory footprint, but we did not yet optimise the Docker
runtime of the PCMs or the underlying Operating System, and
therefore we are confident that this can be offset.
E. Device Hardware
We aimed to build the simplest possible device to provide a
baseline evaluation of whether the model was implementable
on very small footprint devices. We chose the commonly
available ESP8266 platform for our reference device. This chip
provides an embedded 32-bit processor, Wifi connectivity and
a number of digital inputs and outputs for less than US$2.50
each (at the time of writing). ESP8266 supports TLS without
full certificate authority chains. Instead, it uses fingerprints of
SSL certificates to validate them. The device is configured
with the DIdP fingerprint at manufacturing time and then the
IG fingerprint at User Registration time (using the DIpD as
the trusted source for the IG fingerprint).
F. Manufacturing Process
Once the device is operational, it contacts a local manufac-
turing server via MQTT. The server may also have a physical
means of identifying the device (e.g. scanning a bar code on
the device). The manufacturing server calls the DCR API on
the DIdP to register the device, and then sends the Client ID
and Secret to the device over MQTT, where they are stored in
EEPROM. The QR Code is then printed and attached to the
device. When this QR code is scanned, the DIdP first checks
that the device is switched on and connected to the DIdP. It
then prompts the user to login via a UIdP (e.g. redirecting to
Google’s authentication). Once the user is logged on the user is
asked to authorize the device. This initiates a modified OAuth2
flow with the device, resulting in the refresh token being stored
in the device’s EEPROM. The device is now ready for use.
G. Sample Third Party Application
In order to demonstrate this system we also created a simple
web-based cloud service. This first connects to the OAuthing
DIdP using a standard OAuth2 HTTP flow to request access
to IGNITE. The user logs in using the same UIdP that they
registered their device with. After the user authorizes the
Sample TPA to access IGNITE the sample app is loaded. This
uses MQTT over WebSockets to communicate, and presents
a simple UI allowing users to interact with the device.
IV. EVALUATION
The main result is that there is a working prototype of
the model that demonstrates all aspects of this decoupled
2https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto.rsmb
Fig. 6: Test Environment
approach, including support on a low-cost device and a Cloud
implementation of the server-side components3.
A. Results
Figure 6 shows a simplified diagram of the test environment,
which is running in a public cloud environment.
Figure 7 shows the latency comparison of IGNITE com-
pared to Mosquitto (a standard MQTT server) using the
one second client. Figure 8 shows the mean, 95% and 99%
percentiles for the IGNITE latency responses in the same test.
The graph demonstrates that IGNITE shows consistently low
latencies across all workloads. The additional latency added to
message interactions compared to Mosquitto was around 1ms.
The percentiles show that 99% of requests had latency of less
than 11ms even when the system was loaded with 400 test
clients, and 95% of requests had latency less than 6ms. Given
that average round trip ping times over the Internet are in the
20-80ms range, these are good results.
The next data point collected was the maximum number
of PCMs that could be run on a single cloud server. The
tests were run on a server with 2Gb of memory and no swap
configured, costing US$20/month. This environment was able
support at least 400 PCM instances, with the server running
out of memory beyond 415 containers. Simply adding swap
will increase this number at the cost of some latency, but we
have not yet evaluated this balance.
Figure 9 shows the average connect time for three different
scenarios. The fastest is the Mosquitto broker, with an average
connect time of 24.5ms. The slowest is the IGNITE when the
user has not previously connected. In this scenario, the system
needs to introspect the token and then wait until the new
container is launched and ready. This takes on average 1294ms
(1.3 seconds). While this is comparatively large, it happens
rarely in the system and in practice devices take between 2
and 10 seconds to connect to local Wifi networks. It could be
ameliorated by pre-loading unused containers and associating
them with users at connect time.
The third scenario is the connect time when there is al-
ready a user container running. The average time here was
3A short video showing the registration and data sharing process is available
at http://freo.me/oauthing-video
35.9ms. The extra latency compared with Mosquitto (35.9ms
vs 24.5ms) is well within acceptable ranges.
Fig. 7: One second client:
IGNITE vs Mosquitto
Fig. 8: Latency percentiles
for IGNITE
Finally, figure 10 shows the performance of the IGNITE
system under stress. This shows that the server was handling
more than 4500 sent messages per second at all levels and
the average latency rose to 83.3ms when the system had 400
concurrent clients. This test shows that the system would
support each user owning 600 devices each interacting once
a minute, even when the system is fully loaded with 400
concurrent PCM containers. The latency line shows that as new
clients are added the latency increases in direct proportion,
demonstrating fair allocation of resources.
Fig. 9: MQTT Connect Time
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V. RELATED WORK
In [8] we previously looked at using Federated Identities
for IoT, especially mapping OAuth2 tokens to work with the
MQTT protocol. In a follow up work [9], we demonstrated
the use of the Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) API to
support each device having a unique OAuth2 client identifier.
In each case identifiers needed to be manually added to
the device, which is unrealistic in manufacturing processes.
Existing public IoT middleware such as IBM Watson IoT and
AWS IoT also have this concern. Compared to these previous
works, this current model adds a clear automated device and
user registration process. It also adds anonymous identities and
Personal Cloud Middleware.
IOT-OAS [10] addresses the use of OAuth2 with the CoAP
protocol. The mapping of the OAuth2 Token API to support
IoT devices using the CoAP protocol is being formalised
in [11], and is described in [12]. In [13] there is a demonstra-
tion of the OAuth1 protocol with MQTT, favouring OAuth1
over OAuth2 for IoT devices. The reasons for choosing the
older OAuth protocol are obviated by the mapping of the
refresh flow which OAuthing offers. In [14] and in [15]
there are platforms that support OAuth2 for IoT devices that
communicate via HTTP and WebSockets. None of these works
address automated registration processes, and none provide the
privacy controls of anonymous identifiers or isolated personal
cloud instances.
In [16] a capability-based access system is described that
allows anonymous identities to be used. [17] provides an
Architecture Reference Model for an approach that supports
anonymous identities. Neither of these systems separate the
provision of anonymous identities from the data-sharing mid-
dleware.
The concept of a Personal Zone Hub (PZH) is described in
the Webinos [18] system: this is similar to our PCM. However,
in Webinos users must instantiate the PZH themselves, and
there is no analysis of the cost per user. We extend the
PZH concept to support a dynamic instantiation of PCMs
as containers and provide a cost model. Webinos does not
address secure federated device identities and does not provide
a registration process.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The OAuthing model provides significant improvements
over existing systems, providing much stronger guarantees of
privacy. Data and identity are not shared without consent, and
data can be shared anonymously. Device and user registration
are automated, and the PCM model can prevent fingerprinting,
sharing of IP and MAC addresses, as well as user and device
identity.
A key concern around the PCM model is that the cost per
user might be too high. The prototype demonstrates that PCMs
can be automatically deployed on behalf of the user with
acceptable times. The experimental results demonstrate that
a US$20/month cloud server can support 400 users, resulting
in a cost per user of just $0.05 per month. Further optimization
could reduce this cost.
The OAuthing model and prototype demonstrate that de-
vices can be connected to TPAs without inherently leaking the
user’s identity to either system. User’s may choose to provide
TPAs with their identity, but that becomes a positive consent of
the user rather than the default. In addition users can bring pre-
existing identities to the system rather than being required to
create new credentials, which reduces the chances of password
theft and gives users a choice of identity provider.
There remain a number of unexplored aspects of this model.
We expect to add tests that evaluate the performance of the
OAuthing DIdP. In addition we plan to extend the system
to support multiple co-existing DIdPs. We have discussed
this model with two significant device manufacturers. One
potential concern is that some device manufacturers’ business
models are based around collecting user data and therefore
this system is unattractive precisely because it improves users
privacy. However, there are a number of areas where this
approach offers significant benefits, for example in medical
devices, where the manufacturer does not wish to access data
for regulatory reasons. In addition, it is possible to start with
the OAuthing model and progressively lessen certain privacy
controls to provide a system that still shares data but provides
stronger guarantees.
We have identified a number of future items of research
around this, including developing a full threat model for the
system; supporting devices that communicate via gateways
(e.g. Bluetooth devices talking to a phone or hub); and
demonstrating clustering and high-availability for the OAu-
thing DIdP and IGNITE. We have also identified that further
de-centralisation maybe possible by utilizing distributed ledger
technologies such as Blockchains with the DIdP to reduce the
requirement to have a central IdP for devices.
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